



FIGHTING TO BALANCE  
CHINA AND THE PURPOSE OF THE  
INDIA-US PARTNERSHIP

POLICY PAPER III

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SPECIAL ISSUE I

"EVASION TO ACCEPTANCE: INDIA'S  
APPROACH TO CHINA 2020-2030"

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PROF. RAJESH RAJAGOPALAN



## Summary

- The India-US relationship, that has grown significantly in the last two decades, offers both nations crucial elbow room in dealing with China's burgeoning presence in the Indo-Pacific.
- The US is unlikely to be directly involved in a Sino-Indian war. However, India could benefit immensely from the US in terms of military signaling, sophisticated technology transfer, and intelligence sharing.
- India could benefit from US support in multilateral forums where China has attempted to act against Indian interests. America's influence at forums such as the NSG and the UNSC could stem China's growing diplomatic clout, thereby protecting and promoting India's interests.
- The India-US military relationship needs to be viewed from a broader perspective that incorporates indirect advantages for both nations.

## About the author



Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan is Professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His publications include three books: *Nuclear South Asia: Keywords and Concepts* [co-authored with Atul Mishra]; *Fighting like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency*; and *Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia*. His articles have appeared in a number of academic and policy journals as well as major Indian newspapers.

## About this Special Issue

Recent events have brought home the realisation that China's rise is bound to have serious implications for India and other smaller states in the region. It is now clear that India-China relations may be at an inflection point. An increasingly aggressive China is pushing at its peripheries to announce its arrival at the global stage. While this has been happening for quite some time in the South China Sea, India is its most recent victim in South Asia. It is therefore necessary that India recognises this geopolitical reality and puts together a coherent strategy to balance China. To this end, this special issue consists of articles that make policy prescriptions for India for the next decade.

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Council for Strategic and Defense Research

3, Pratap Singh Building,

Janpath Lane,

New Delhi - 110001.

Phone: 01143104566

E-mail: [csdroffice@gmail.com](mailto:csdroffice@gmail.com)

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## Introduction

While US-India relations have strengthened over the last two decades, there is still considerable misunderstanding about the utility, purpose, and potential of this alignment. There are, of course, clear limits to the relationship. As of mid-2020, no one expects that this relationship is, or even likely to become, a mutual military defense pact. There is no interest in such a mutual defense agreement in either countries, nor do current conditions warrant such an alliance. But exaggerating the expectations and requirements of the partnership is one way to ensure the relationship does not live up to its potential. Suggesting that the partnership must be limited to maritime issues – indirectly suggesting that the partnership has to be limited because the US will not defend India in a war with China – is one such argument.<sup>i</sup> Similarly, suggesting that there cannot be an alignment unless another country shares India’s “precise set of interests” (or “100%” of India’s interests) is a standard by which no alliance or alignment would exist in international politics, besides being unfaithful to India’s own diplomatic history.<sup>ii</sup> Alignments, even mutual defense pacts, are always partnerships of necessity and last only as long as they are considered useful by each of the sides.

But the current conditions also suggest the possibility of a deeper US-India relationship than the two sides have achieved so far. In this essay, I outline the purposes and objectives of such a closer relationship. I argue that though the US may not fight alongside India in a border war with China, there are a number of ways in which US assistance might be crucial for India in such a war. But more importantly, whether the US will fight to militarily defend India against China is the wrong criterion to judge India’s partnership with the US. The primary purpose of the partnership is twofold: to improve India’s capabilities to militarily balance China on its own; and to enhance the broader diplomatic balancing against China. I begin by examining the role the US could play in any Sino-Indian war, which includes intelligence support, arms supplies, diplomatic support, and military signaling. The next section covers the necessity and potential of US assistance in balancing China, examining both military and political balancing. The concluding section summarizes my argument.

## US Role in a Sino-Indian War

Even if US forces do not engage in military combat alongside Indian forces against China at the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC), the US role in a Sino-Indian war will not be as insignificant as generally imagined. Active US participation alongside India will obviously improve India’s chances of victory, but there are a number of reasons why US participation is unlikely. Above all, the US will most likely not participate unless there is a mutual defense

treaty that requires US participation, and which includes an American security commitment. The US has concluded many such treaties, of varying commitment, with many countries, including Pakistan in 1953, as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and, of course, European states under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>iii</sup> Such treaties do not always require accompanying commitments by its allies to come to US assistance in other parts of the world, but they are complicated arrangements with at least some mutual obligations that are likely to be viewed as onerous by India, as well as by the US. Fears about such obligations – that India will be required to fight in American wars – are frequently cited as the reason not to build closer strategic ties with the US, let alone a mutual defense treaty.<sup>iv</sup> This fear persists despite the fact that India sought US security assistance twice in the 1960s: during the 1962 war with China; and in the late 1960s, when India sought a nuclear security guarantee.<sup>v</sup> Moreover, India did sign a ‘Friendship Treaty’ in 1971 with the Soviet Union which included mutual consultation, if not a commitment to security assistance, in the event of a security threat. Indeed, this fear of being obligated in some manner (even a limited obligation of hosting US personnel temporarily) was **one reason** why India took well over a decade to sign relatively minor facilitation arrangements such as LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), and other foundational military cooperation agreements with the US. In addition, it must be noted that there is growing weariness about such commitments in the US because these are seen as dragging the US into unnecessary wars, though scholars have disputed the entangling nature of American alliances.<sup>vi</sup>

India’s opposition to mutual defense agreements, a deeply held element of its political culture, are also a function of a fundamental reality: India does have sufficient military capability to defend itself along the Sino-Indian border. Though there is some disagreement over the Sino-Indian military balance, with some suggesting a much more optimistic scenario than others, what is clear is that the balance is not heavily tilted against India that New Delhi requires allies to fight alongside it.<sup>vii</sup> Since the defeat in the 1962 war with China, India has created dedicated army formations for the Sino-Indian frontier which, especially in a defensive role, can be expected to hold their own in any military confrontation with China. India does not require additional forces on the border, even though there may be other ways in which Indian military capabilities may need to be enhanced. In this respect, India is fundamentally different from other powers in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea and Australia that feel the requirement for US forces, at least as a tripwire, to deter aggression.

There are additional complications with any direct U.S. participation in a Sino-Indian war. For one, any US involvement would immediately reduce India’s autonomy in managing the war, both strategies for prosecuting it as well as terminating it.

Another problem, not considered so far, is that such direct American involvement also carries with it the possibility of expanding the war from the LAC to the wider Indo-Pacific. This is something both India and the US would wish to avoid. For India, such widening complicates its own calculations and reduces its autonomy in managing a confrontation with China. A wider war would require taking into consideration not only American interests but also that of other Indo-Pacific nations that could be drawn into the war because of potential ‘chain-ganging’ effects. For the US, similarly, in addition to the burden of fighting alongside India, a serious concern will be the possibility that its allies might take advantage of the situation. Though the US has encouraged allies, such as Japan, to play a larger role in regional defense in order to reduce American burdens, the US has also carefully sought to control the possibility of escalation.

Even if there is no direct US participation in combat along the LAC, India has benefited from US assistance in its confrontations with China, and will continue to expect a number of these benefits, including intelligence sharing, arms supply, shoring up diplomatic support in multilateral forums such as the UN, and visible forms of military signaling to support India.

### *Intelligence*

During the 2017 Doklam crisis, the US was **reported** to have shared intelligence with India about China’s troop deployments. There have been **similar reports** of US providing intelligence assistance during the current Ladakh confrontation. Sameer Lalwani **notes** that the US could “enhance India’s technical intelligence and assessment capacity”, of course on the basis of reciprocity. India’s Chief of Defense Staff, General Bipin Rawat, has also **noted** that one area where India expects help from the US is in terms of intelligence sharing.

### *Arms Supplies*

The US can be expected to support India with additional military transfers during a confrontation with China. However, two caveats should be noted. The US is not the lone supplier; India will expect other suppliers to provide equipment during a crisis, either to make up for shortfalls or for replacement of expended equipment. Most suppliers who are interested in maintaining their position in the lucrative Indian arms market will comply with such requests, including France, Israel and Russia.<sup>viii</sup> Since the US supplies only a few combat items, such supplies are likely to be quantitatively lesser than those provided by other suppliers. Nevertheless, US replenishments or additional purchases are in niche areas, such as surveillance and intelligence, or in advanced equipment, such as the AH-64 Apache helicopter,

and they represent critical capabilities that will make a difference on the battlefield. For example, India **used** the US-supplied P-8I surveillance aircraft to monitor Chinese forces during the Doklam crisis, even though the aircraft is optimized for maritime surveillance. India will continue to expect such assistance.

### *Diplomatic Support*

Though the consequence of any war between major powers is unlikely to be decided by the United Nations (UN) or even the Security Council (UNSC), support in such forums is important. One of the great benefits that India received as a consequence of signing the 'Friendship Treaty' with the Soviet Union in August 1971 was that it forced Moscow to wield three vetoes to support India in the UNSC during the India-Pakistan war a few months later. Such support will likely be important in any future Sino-Indian war for two reasons. First, China, as a UNSC permanent member, can attempt to drum up UNSC support and blame India for the war. Second, it is likely that Russia, until recently a strong supporter of India, will hesitate to go against China because of Russia's political dependence on China, a consequence of the continuing disagreements between Russia and the Western powers. Though Russia did **join** Western powers against China when China attempted to raise the Kashmir issue in the UNSC last year, it is not a certainty that Russia will take such a position to support India in the context of a Sino-Indian war. This will make US support much more critical to India. In addition to the UNSC, India will be concerned about ensuring broad global support in such an eventuality, which will be easier with the US on India's side.

### *Military Signaling*

Even without direct US participation in a Sino-Indian war, the US can support India through military signaling. This could be done in a number of ways: the two countries could announce bilateral meetings and dialogues between senior military leaders; the US could send its warships or submarines on port visits to India; and, the two countries could announce previously unscheduled joint military exercises. Such signaling has been a staple of military diplomacy during the Cold War, including the US sending Task Force 74 to the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan during the 1971 war.<sup>ix</sup> There is every reason to expect that the US will engage in such signaling, though this time, in support of India.

To summarize, though India is unlikely to need active American combat participation in any future war with China, and neither India nor the US will likely want the additional complications that will result from such participation, the American role will likely be far more

extensive than generally anticipated. Nevertheless, the primary Indian purpose of partnering with the US is not for assistance during a possible war, but in preparing India for meeting such an eventuality on its own. Indeed, the success of such preparation will reduce India's need for direct US participation in such a war.

## **US Role in India Balancing China**

Far more consequential than in an actual war, US role will be critical in helping India to balance China. This includes a number of components, from helping enhance India's military capabilities to better prepare to defend Indian territory to diplomatic coordination to counter China's power.

### *Building Indian Military Capabilities*

Though India has a considerably capable military that can match China's along the LAC, the overall balance is slowly shifting against India. This is particularly true in maritime power, and it could extend to air power, which could eventually make itself felt at the LAC. This might not have immediate repercussions, but left unaddressed, could become gravely detrimental for India. One of the primary purposes of a balancing partnership with the US is to ensure that the wealth imbalance with China does not mutate into a military imbalance at the LAC and the maritime balance west of the Malacca straits.

China's growing wealth is being reflected in its military power. Wealth does not always translate well or easily into military power, and there is usually a lag between wealth generation and national military power. Nevertheless, China appears to be on the path to generating considerable amount of military power far quicker than many previous estimates.<sup>x</sup> A comprehensive assessments of China's military power is well beyond the scope of this paper, and it is also necessary to note that the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) potential has yet to be demonstrated in actual combat. Despite these caveats, the following crude indicators still need to be seriously considered for a couple of reasons. First, for Indian planners, while accuracy of assessments is important, it is always more prudent to err on the side of caution. Indian planners must assume that China will be able to develop and utilize these capabilities in combat. It would be far more grievous to find out in a crunch that India under-estimated China's capabilities. Second, since many earlier assessments of China's military capability have proven to be far more conservative and skeptical than warranted, some correction is required on the obverse side as compensation because there are probably unwarranted biases in how outsiders assess the determination and drive in the development of China's capabilities.



A couple of examples should illustrate the rapid growth of the Chinese military's technological capabilities. While India has had an aircraft carrier in service for decades, China's aircraft carrier program is in the process of overtaking India. In just a decade, China has constructed one aircraft that is bigger than any Indian carrier, and it is building at least two more aircraft carriers of larger capacity. The third carrier, 'Type-004', that China is **building** indigenously, will reportedly be as large as the latest generation of America's supercarriers. This rapid pace indicates that, in under a decade, China may possibly have four or more aircraft carriers in operation. It appears unlikely that this will be a coastal defense force. It is far more likely that these carriers are meant to project China's naval power well beyond China's shores, and potentially in the Indian Ocean.

The second example is of fifth-generation fighter planes. From being armed mainly with copies of outdated Soviet-era warplanes until a decade ago, China is now flying at least two fifth-generation fighter planes. It is the only country, other than the US, that is flying two such aircraft. In comparison, Russia has only one such prototype aircraft, and it has yet to enter Russian service. Though India had agreed to cooperate in developing the jet with Russia, it **pulled out** of the program in 2018 reportedly because the plane did not meet performance expectations, especially in stealth.

While India is likely to maintain a defensive balance over the LAC for some time to come, New Delhi will need to consider enhancing its capabilities not only on the land border, but also as a naval power. Even along the LAC, India's current advantage in having a large land force might dwindle if it starts losing the edge in air power. There have been **reports** of China deploying the advanced J-20 fifth-generation fighter in Tibet. This will become a serious problem if these fighters are deployed on a routine basis in Tibet, even accounting for altitude-related disadvantages. Developing Indian capabilities to maintain even a defensive balance with China along the LAC will require greater cooperation and coordination with the US. It should also be noted that many of the traditional arms suppliers may not be able to provide the kind of advanced technology systems that suit India's requirements. For example, no country other than the US and China currently deploy fifth-generation fighters. Similarly, no other country has deployed advanced early warning and surveillance aircraft with the capabilities of the US-built E-3 Sentry AWACS or even the Poseidon P8I maritime surveillance aircraft (which India has already acquired from the US). While India may be able to acquire less capable systems from other countries, this will become a growing disadvantage as China deploys progressively more advanced systems. Countering such Chinese military capabilities is an important objective that is possible only with US assistance.

In addition to helping India's capability for internal balancing, the US can also bring together a number of like-minded partners to coordinate and cooperate in balancing China across the region. This could include an expansion of the Quadrilateral initiative to **include more participants**. The Quad could also take on a more military purpose, as was apparently **hinted** at by India Chief of Defense Staff, General Rawat. Any such region-wide coordination will be difficult without US military power providing a protective umbrella and bearing some of the burden of such coordination. An expansion of region-wide cooperation could also take the form of intelligence sharing among partners. This again would be more likely if the US were to lead such coordination efforts. For example, the **'Five Eyes'** intelligence-sharing program has cooperated with others in the region such as Japan and South Korea, and Japan is seeking a more formal integration into the arrangement. Such efforts – even if not the Five Eyes itself – could be expanded to increase intelligence coordination among regional powers, including India.

Such military balancing efforts, it must be kept in mind, are long- or at least medium-term efforts, undertaken as peacetime capacity-building efforts. These will not be effective if initiated after a crisis begins. Building such balancing capability should be a far more vital objective for US-India partnership than the red-herring of US willingness to fight alongside India at the Tibet border.

### *Balancing China's Influence in Multilateral Forums*

With its increasing wealth, China also has acquired significant influence in multilateral forums. This allows China to act against Indian interests at critical points. This was **demonstrated** in several different instances over the last few years, including China blocking India's attempt to gain membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), its repeated protection of Pakistan over the **Masood Azhar issue**, and its **more recent effort** to raise the Kashmir issue at the UNSC. In September 2020, China even **attempted** to get the UN Security Council to sanction several Indian individuals under the charge of terrorism, though this failed. Though India and its partners managed to scuttle China's efforts on the Kashmir issue, it took several efforts before China relented on the Masood Azhar issue. On the NSG, however, India has not had much success in getting China to revise its objection to India's membership.

On the one hand, such multilateral efforts may have little actual impact on India's national interests or behavior. India has previously been isolated at the UN on various issues, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. But as Gary Bass notes, "although India did end up acting unilaterally, it was not for lack of effort . . . India was desperate for foreign

approval.”<sup>xi</sup> Similarly, India was isolated when it conducted the nuclear tests in 1998, but subsequent Indian governments stayed the course and eventually managed to create some kind of modus vivendi with the global nuclear regime, despite India’s continued refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).<sup>xii</sup> On the other hand, as both the above episodes illustrate, this is not a happy circumstance for India, and it is one which India has worked hard to avoid.

Practically, India’s national interests could be directly impacted by discussions and decisions made at multilateral forums. For example, while India is pursuing the NSG partly to normalize its nuclear status, there are also important implications for India’s interests because the group sets the guidelines for nuclear commerce. This could adversely affect India, though this is often not recognized in the Indian debate.<sup>xiii</sup> The NSG itself was established in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear test in 1974, and designed to tighten rules to ensure that peaceful nuclear transfers to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) do not aid potential nuclear weapons programs in such countries. The NSG reinforced its rules in the early 1990s, moving from ‘partial safeguards’ (international safeguards on equipment or materials transferred to non-nuclear weapon states) to full-scope safeguards (requiring nuclear safeguards on the entire nuclear establishment of the transferee for any nuclear trade).<sup>xiv</sup> The change of rules immediately forced the almost complete cancellation of India’s nuclear commerce, especially with Russia, though the two sides managed to ‘grandfather’ the ongoing nuclear plant project at Kudankulam. This remains a continuing problem. In 2011, NSG changed the rules again pertaining to commerce in nuclear enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Even though this **rule change** affects national interests, India could not participate in negotiations because it is not a member of the NSG. Thus, global rule and norm-making matters to India’s foreign and security interest. Beyond the question of prestige that arrives with becoming a member of these forums, being kept out of these bodies come with a clear cost.

This makes China’s influence in multilateral forums a concern for India’s interests. But India is not well-placed to counter China in such forums. For one, as in NSG or in the UNSC, India is not a member of critical forums while China is making it difficult for India to defend its interests. This is not likely to change either, certainly not in the near future. For example, though India and other aspirants have fought for years for permanent representation at the UNSC, they have not made much headway, not least because China **has and will continue to oppose** Indian membership. In such instances, as in the several efforts that China had made to target India in the UNSC since 2019, India will have to depend on the goodwill of India’s strategic partners to defend Indian interests. Second, even when India may be present, it may

not be able to match China's influence, which is a function both of China's national wealth and China's willingness to wield multiple tools such as economic assistance and coercive trade practices for gaining influence in multilateral gatherings.

Countering China's influence in such settings require the support of the US. While India can call upon other partners, no other power has the influence to counter Chinese efforts consistently other than the US. As mentioned above, India's long-time partner, Russia, is increasingly beholden to China, and unlikely to support India in the context of a direct disagreement between India and China on any international issue. Other partners, such as the various European powers, or India's new partners in the Indo-Pacific region like Australia and Japan, do not have sufficient support in multilateral forums to lock horns with China. This makes American support vital for India in such settings.

Even more importantly, American leadership and its hegemonic position allows for a large number of allies and partners, from the Indo-Pacific to Europe, who can come together under American leadership to support India, as in the case of the NSG. American behavior towards India itself sends a signal to others about how to treat India. India should be familiar with this logic, having been at both ends of this effect. The strong US opposition to India's 1998 nuclear tests led many of America's allies to take equally strong – or in some cases even harsher – measures against India. But after the US reversed its decision and decided to build a strategic partnership with India, many of these countries followed suit. One good example, though not the only one, is Australia. One of India's closest strategic partners today, Australia had taken a very strong stand against the tests, but reversed itself after US-India relations improved in the early 2000s.<sup>xv</sup> While India will still need to work to build partnerships and support from other powers, having the US on its side assures India of the almost automatic support of a number of additional countries, considerably reducing the level of effort that India needs to employ and with greater effect.

Such multilateral balancing efforts can also help counter China's use of coercive trading practices, that have affected many countries in the region. China's ability to use such tactics stems from the vulnerability of relatively smaller countries who are dependent on China's economy. India, Japan and Australia have already begun discussing 'supply chain resilience', but such efforts are likely to become more widespread with US participation.

Thus, balancing China's influence in multilateral settings has to be considered an important Indian strategic objective, but one that will be very difficult for India to accomplish by itself. America's relative power has declined considerably over the last two decades, but it still

remains the most powerful nation by most indices of national power. In addition, it has an important legacy asset in the form of a sprawling world-wide network of partners and allies that continue to support American global influence. This asset is necessary for India to leverage, protect and promote India's interests while attempting to balance China's growing diplomatic clout.

## Conclusion

Proximity and power make China an almost automatic threat to Indian interests and even to Indian territory. While India has sufficient military capability to hold its own along the border, the growing imbalance of power with China will begin to minimize the balance at the LAC, over time. Moreover, the imbalance of power with China matters in other telling ways beyond the LAC. This requires India to align with other countries who are also concerned about China's power, as well as the manner in which China has chosen to wield its power. Of these countries, the US remains the most powerful and a natural choice. But the value of an alignment with the US is not in a shooting war with China, though the US could be of assistance in such a scenario. Rather, the primary objective of a US alignment is to strengthen Indian military capability to better meet the threat from China, and to balance China's political power and pressure in various ways, including multilateral forums and international trade.

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<sup>i</sup> Shyam Saran, "A lopsided strategic partnership," *Business Standard*, 14 April 2016, [https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-saran-a-lopsided-strategic-partnership-116041400917\\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/shyam-saran-a-lopsided-strategic-partnership-116041400917_1.html); Bharat Bhushan, "China crisis: What are India's options beyond aligning with the US?", *The Quint*, 26 June 2020, <https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-border-conflict-india-military-diplomatic-options-allies-united-states-strategy>; Kartik Bommakanti, "American military support to India is not automatic in China-India war. Delhi must know it," *The Print*, 22 July 2020, <https://theprint.in/opinion/american-military-support-to-india-is-not-automatic-in-china-india-war-delhi-must-know-it/466196/>

<sup>ii</sup> Both statements are from former Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, but reflective of a larger foreign policy attitude in New Delhi. The first quote is from Shivshankar Menon, "India's Foreign Affairs Strategy", Brookings India Impact Series, May 2020, p. 14. The second quote can be found in Devirupa Mitra, "Menon: India-China informal summit a good first step, need actions next," *TheWire.in*, 2 May 2018, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/shivshankar-menon-india-china-wuhan-korea>

<sup>iii</sup> Jennifer Kavanagh, *US Security-Related Agreements in Force since 1955: Introducing a New Database* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2014); Michael John Garcia and R. Chuck Mason, *Congressional Oversight and Related Issues*

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*Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012).

<sup>iv</sup> Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Did India Lose China?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 42:1 (2019), pp. 71-87.

<sup>v</sup> The 1962 episode is well covered, most recently in Tanvi Madan, *Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations During the Cold War* (Gurgaon: Penguin-Viking, 2020), pp. 142-48. For the nuclear guarantee episode, see Andrew Kennedy, "India's Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments and the Bomb," *International Security*, 36:2 (Fall 2011), pp. 120-53.

<sup>vi</sup> Michael Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts," *International Security*, 39:4 (Spring 2015), pp. 7-48.

<sup>vii</sup> The more optimistic scenario can be found in Frank O'Donnell and Alex Bollfrass, *The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide* (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2020). For a slightly less optimistic picture, see, Daniel Kliman, Iskander Rehman, Kristine Lee and Joshua Fitt, *Imbalance of Power: India's Military Choices in an Era of Strategic Competition with China* (Washington, D.C.: Center for A New American Security, 2019).

<sup>viii</sup> "India-China tensions: Allies help India muscle up for a hostile neighbourhood" *Economic Times*.

<sup>ix</sup> Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: United States Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978)

<sup>x</sup> For earlier sanguine assessments, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: China's Rise and the Fate of America's Global Position," *International Security*, 40:3 (Winter 2015/16), pp. 7-53; Michael Beckley, "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security* 36:3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41-78.

<sup>xi</sup> Gary J. Bass, "The Indian Way of Humanitarian Intervention," *Yale Journal of International Law* 40:2 (2015), p. 276.

<sup>xii</sup> Mark Hibbs, "Eyes on the Prize: India's Pursuit of Membership in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group," *The Nonproliferation Review* 24:3-4 (2017), pp. 275-96; Michal Smetana, "De-Stigmatising the Outsider: Nuclear-armed India, United States, and the Global Nonproliferation Order," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 23 (2020), pp. 535-58.

<sup>xiii</sup> Mitra, "Menon: India-China informal summit a good first step, need actions next."

<sup>xiv</sup> Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlstrom and Vitaly Fedchenko, *Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group*, SIPRI Research Report No. 22 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

<sup>xv</sup> Dhruva Jaishankar, "India-Australia ties have evolved: build on them now," *Hindustan Times*, 13 January 2020, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/india-australia-ties-have-evolved-build-on-them-now/story-BSuZVst3ji0VgqXreZI5LM.html> ; Peter Mayer and Purnendra Jain, "Beyond Cricket: Australia-India Evolving Relations," *Australian Journal of Political Science* 45:1 (2010) pp. 133-48.